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Diverging economic inequality has become a common focus of economic de-
bate in developed countries. In particular, the recent experience of Japan
has started attracting international attention. We take advantage of a rich
micro-level data set from the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (1989-2003)
to perform an in-depth analysis of the change in the inequality and distrib-
ution of the hourly wage. We observe that lower returns to education and
years of tenure contribute to diminishing income disparity between groups
for both sexes. A larger variance within a group contributes to the wage
disparity for males, while an increased heterogeneity of workers’ attributes
contributes to the wage disparity for females. The Dinardo, Fortin, and
Lemieux decomposition also conﬁrms the basic ﬁndings from a parametric
variance decomposition.
Key Words: Wage Distribution, Wage Equation, Variance Decomposition,
DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux Decomposition, Japan.
JEL Classiﬁcation Code: J311 Introduction
Economic inequality recently has become a major focus of political debate
in many developed countries. In such debates, Japan’s experience over the
last 15 years has started attracting international attention (Economist, the
[2006] and OECD [2006]). The long-lasting stagnation of the Japanese econ-
omy during the 1990s, rapid globalization and technological change, and
the recent economic reform toward deregulation and a more market-oriented
economy initiated by Prime Minister Koizumi from 2001 are claimed to be
responsible for widening income inequality. While the debate on the reason
for broadened inequality is heating up, the premise of the debates that Japan
has experienced widening inequality has not yet been decisively conﬁrmed.
The trend of the income inequality of Japan, which has the world’s second-
largest economy, also has attracted much attention from labor economists
because it can oﬀer a testing ground for determining whether the recent
income dispersion in the US, UK, and Canada can be explained by such
global factors as skill-biased technological change (SBTC) or globalization of
the economy (Katz and Murphy [1992] and Juhn et al. [1993]) Similar to other
developed countries, Japan has experienced the penetration of information
technology (Kawaguchi [2006]) and an increased degree of competition with
newly emerging economies, in particular, with neighboring Asian countries
(Higuchi and Genda [1999], Head and Ries [2002], Fukao [2002] for the eﬀect
of FDI and Sakurai [2004] for the eﬀect of trade) over the last 15 years. Thus,if these two factors explain the ongoing income disparity in the US, the UK,
and Canada, we should observe a similar income dispersion in Japan, too.
Considering the recent revisionist view that casts doubt on the traditional
SBTC and globalization hypotheses for income or wage dispersion (Card
and DiNardo [2002]), it is crucial to examine what happened to the income
distribution in the world’s second largest economy. In fact, Saez and Piketty
[2005] reports that an increase in the concentration of income in the top 0.1
percent of the income distribution was not observed during 80s and 90s in
Japan, contrary to ﬁndings from the US, the UK, and Canada.
In contrast to the high level of interest in the recent trend of income in-
equality of Japan among the general public and economists, there has not
been a consensus regarding whether income inequality widened during the
1990s and onward. A few studies have arrived at diﬀerent conclusions regard-
ing the trend in income inequality. Tachibanaki [2005] claimed that income
inequality widened during the 80s and 90s and that the Gini coeﬃcient of
pre-tax income increased to the point that it is as large as the number for
the US and the UK. In contrast, Ohtake [2005] claims that the increase in
income inequality is partly due to the aging population; the degree of income
inequality is intrinsically high among elderly people and the aging population
mechanically widens income inequality.1
1Although journalists have described the discrepancy between the two results as a con-
troversy, the two authors’ sets of results authors do not contradict. Tachibanaki [2005]
reported unconditional income inequality, while Ohtake [2005] reported conditional in-
equality. Ohtake [2005] also pointed out that the income measure Tachibanaki [2005] used
to calculate the Gini coeﬃcient is not comparable to the income measure used for the US
2Regarding wage inequality, Ohtake [2005] pointed out the decline of the
between-group wage diﬀerential and the increase of the within-group wage
diﬀerentials, but he did not decompose the movement of the inequality in
a systematic way. Shinozaki [2002] reported an an exceptional study that
analyzed the change in the wage distribution during the 1990s using the
log wage variance decomposition based on aggregate data provided by the
Ministry of Labor and Welfare. He found that wage inequality for both sexes
remained the same during the 1990s. He could not, however, decompose the
inequality by the education-experience-tenure cell due to limitations of the
aggregate data.
Given the research results for Japan introduced above, this study fo-
cuses on the wage distribution, exploiting micro-level data of 1989-2003 from
the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (BSWS) compiled by the Ministry of
Health, Labor and Welfare (formerly, the Ministry of Labor) of the Japanese
government. This study contributes to the existing literature in the following
two ways. First, this is the ﬁrst study to focus on the change in wage dis-
tribution using micro data. Focusing on labor income is important because
it is the most important source of income for most people and hypotheses
on income dispersions, such as the STBC hypothesis and the globalization
hypothesis, predict a dispersion of labor income rather than total income. Al-
because the income measure that Tachibanaki [2005] used did not include a pre-tax pen-
sion payment, but the income measure used to calculate US number did include it. After
adjusting for the discrepancies between the Japanese and US income measures, Ohtake
[2005] concluded that the Gini coeﬃcient for Japan is smaller than that of the US.
3though this study does not aim to identify the speciﬁc reason for the change
in wage inequality, it does oﬀer descriptive evidence regarding whether the
change in the wage distribution observed in Japan is consistent with the
STBC or the globalization hypothesis. Second, exploiting the micro data
feature, this study decomposes the log wage variance among ﬁnely deﬁned
groups of workers in a systematic way. Thus, we can precisely attribute the
change in the log wage variance to between- and within- group changes. In
addition, micro data enables us to visually examine the entire distribution of
the log wage using the kernel density estimation without discarding informa-
tion. Further, DiNardo et al. [1996] the decomposition technique enables us
to calculate the counterfactual log wage distribution in 2003 if the distribu-
tion of worker and establishment attributes were the same as those in 1989.
This enables us to infer whether the change in the log wage distribution is
caused by a distributional change in attributes or a mapping from attributes
to log wage.
We show that the modest decline in the variance of the log wage in the
ﬁrst half of the 1990s is attributable to the smaller variance between groups
due to lower returns to education and years of tenure. The diminishing
return to education is mainly caused by an increase of 2- and 4-year college
graduates during the period due to the deregulation of college openings by the
Ministry of Education. The diminishing return to job tenure is mainly caused
by an increase in the average years of job tenure, partly due to the aging
of the Japanese population (Chuma [1998] and Shimizutani and Yokoyama
4[2006]). In contrast, the expansion in the variance among males after 1997 is
explained by a larger variance within the group: a larger residual variance in
the wage equation. The variance increase among female after the mid-1990s
was mainly due to greater heterogeneity in terms of attributes (years of job
tenure, in particular).
The kernel estimation of the log wage distribution shows that the shape
of the wage distribution did not change much between 1989 and 2003. Di-
Nardo et al. [1996]’s decomposition, however, reveals that this stability is the
product of two opposing eﬀects. The mapping from workers’ and establish-
ments’ attributes to log wage has changed so that the wage distribution is
compressed, mainly due to the diminished return to education and tenure,
while the variance of attributes and residuals increased. In other words,
between-group variance has decreased, while within-group variance has in-
creased among males. The results for females are similar to those for males,
but the eﬀect of the change in the attribute distribution is much larger than
the eﬀect of the change in residual distribution for females. This ﬁnding
is consistent with the ﬁndings from the log variance decomposition; female
full-time workers became more heterogeneous from 1989 to 2003.
An additional ﬁnding from the DFL decomposition regarding the 1989-
2003 change is that the mapping from the attributes to wage has changed
such that the bottom half of the wage distribution increased. In contrast, the
distributional change in the upper half of the distribution cannot be explained
by the change in the relation between attributes and wage. The distributional
5change between 1989 and 2003 in the upper half of the distribution is mainly
caused by the distributional change in the attributes and unexplained factors.
Our empirical examination proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a
brief data description, and Section 3 reports the estimation results of the
wage equations for full-time workers by years and examines the change in
the estimated parameters on workers’ attributes, which is the basis for the
remaining explorations. Section 4 performs a variance decomposition of wage
rates for full-time workers into the change in the estimated coeﬃcients in the
wage equation, the variance of workers’ attributes, and the residual variance.
Contributions of each component uncover what is responsible for change in
the wage rate variance. Section 5 turns to an application of the DiNardo
et al. [1996] analysis. Section 6 expands our analysis by adding part-time
workers to the sample and reexamines the change in the wage distribution
for female workers, whose share of part- time workers is higher than that
for male workers. The last section summarizes our empirical ﬁndings and
discusses their policy implications.
2 Data
The data set used in this study is micro-level data from the Basic Survey
on Wage Structure (BSWS hereafter), compiled annually by the Japanese
government between 1989 and 2004. This survey holds some unusual ad-
vantages. First, it is a representative survey performed by the government
with an unusually large number of observations randomly chosen from all
6regions and industries in Japan. The annual number of observations is ap-
proximately 1.5 million workers from 60-70 thousand establishments. The
sample includes all establishments with 10 or more employees in both pri-
vate and public sectors and all establishments that belong to private ﬁrms
with ﬁve to nine permanent workers.
The establishments in the sample are randomly chosen in proportion to
the size of prefectures, industries, and number of employees from the Survey
of Firms and Establishments SFE that lists all the establishments in Japan.
This list is revised every 2-3 years. In the relevant years for our analysis,
the lists were revised in 1986, 1991, 1994, 1996, 1999, and 2001. The BSWS
1989-1992 sample is randomly picked from the 1986 SFE list, the 1993-1995
sample is from the 1991 list, the 1996-1997 sample is from the 1994 list, the
1998-2001 sample is from the 1996 list, and the 2002-2003 sample is from the
1999 list. While the sampling is based on the same list, about half of the
establishments are picked in two consecutive years, but only about 1/10 of
the establishments are picked in the sample at the time of the list revision.
We should recognize the large discontinuity of the analysis sample at the
times of the list revision: 1993, 1996, 1998, and 2002.
The randomly selected establishments were asked to extract their work-
ers’ information from their payroll records. A person in charge of personnel
matters in each establishment was asked to randomly choose a number of
workers from its pool of employees based on the given instructions for ran-
dom sampling, including the sampling probability, which depended on the
7establishment size and industry. The establishment and individual ﬁles were
merged using an establishment identiﬁcation number.
Second, the survey contains a variety of variables. The unit of analysis
is an individual worker with relevant information from the establishment to
which he/she belongs. In addition to variables related to wages, the avail-
able information includes each worker’s age, sex, educational attainment,
full-time/part-time status, type of work or job, employment status (with or
without permanent status), working days/hours, as well as the ﬁrm’s at-
tributes, including the number of permanent workers (Joyo Rodo Sha)2, ﬁrm
size, industry, and location.
Regarding wages, the individual data include the contracted hours of work
and overtime hours between June 1 and June 30, and the total amount of pay-
ment for the corresponding period, including overtime pay and allowances,
such as dependent allowance and transportation allowance. It also records
the total bonus payment between January 1 and December 31 of the previous
year. The wage rate in this study is deﬁned as the hourly rate of pay, which
is calculated by dividing the total payment in June plus one twelfth of the
total bonus payment in the previous year by the sum of the contracted hours
of work in June and the overtime work hours in June.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the main variables used in this
2Those workers who satisfy one of the following three criteria are classiﬁed as permanent
workers: 1. On contracts that do not clearly specify a contractual time period, 2: On
contracts that last more than a month, or 3: On contracts that last less than a month, but
on which the workers worked 18 or more days in the last two months. This classiﬁcation
includes part-time workers if one of the criteria above is satisﬁed.
8study. The sample presented in the table is conﬁned to full-time workers
in the private sector. We proceed with our analysis without placing any
limitations on workers’ age.3
First, the average nominal wage rate (WageRate) increased until 1993 and
then leveled oﬀ after the period, which is common to both male and female
workers. Although it decreased slightly after 2000, the average wage rate
in real terms (W/p) deﬂated by Consumer Price Index at the 2000 constant
price was almost constant due to deﬂation.
Second, potential years of experience (Exper), deﬁned as age minus years
of education minus 6, declined in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, but expanded
again after the decade ended. Third, the average years of tenure (Tenure),
deﬁned as the years an employee had worked for the current ﬁrm, extended
between 1989 and 2003 by 1.6 years for male and 2.2 years for female workers.
As Shimizutani and Yokoyama [2006] discussed, the long-term employment
practice survived for those workers within the scheme, and thus their years of
tenure expanded, mainly due to the aging of the population and the extension
of the mandatory retirement age in the 1990s.
Fourth, we observe a higher educational attainment between 1989 and
2003. The share of junior high school graduates (Educ≤9) decreased, while
that of university graduates (Educ≥16) increased by 10 percentage points,
which is common to both male and female workers. The share of senior high
3Our results are unchanged even after limiting the sample to workers whose ages are
15-65.
9school graduates (Educ=12) decreased and that of two-year college graduates
(Educ=14) gained substantially for female workers, though those shares were
mostly unchanged for male workers.
Turning to ﬁrms’ characteristics, ﬁrm size expanded in the ﬁrst half of the
1990s for both male and female workers, reached their peaks during 1993-
1995, and then returned to its level of the ﬁrst half of the 1990s again.4
The establishment size, deﬁned as the number of permanent workers in an
establishment, showed a smaller variation than ﬁrm size, though there was a
slightly declining trend after the mid-1990s for male workers.
In sum, while the real wage rates leveled oﬀ after the mid-1990s, we
observe remarkable increases in the workers’ years of tenure and educational
attainment. The average potential years of experience was not associated
with the rapid speed of aging, partly because of the longer years of education.
Regarding wage inequality, Figure 1 draws four measures of log wage
inequality: the diﬀerence between the 90th and 10th percentiles, the variance
of the log wage, the Gini coeﬃcient, and the Theil index. Regardless of the
measure we used, the inequality in the log wage declined until the mid-1990s,
kept the same level in the late-1990s, and started increasing from 2000 for
males. The log wage inequality declined by 1995 and kept the level afterward
for females. The sudden jumps in the log wage variance and the 90th and 10th
4The variable for ﬁrm size is classiﬁed into several intervals in the Basic Survey on
Wage Structure. We assigned the mid-point for each interval: 5,000 for 5,000 and above
persons, 3,000 for 1,000-4,999 persons, 750 for 500-999 persons, 400 for 300-499 persons,
200 for 100-299 persons, 65 for 30-99 persons, 20 for 10-29 persons, and 7 for 5-9 persons.
10percentiles diﬀerence in 1993 were probably due to the revision of the list of
establishments. We attempted to correct for this gap by using a re-weighting
procedure without success. This point should be noted as a caveat. It is
rather surprising that the log wage inequality declined throughout the 1990s,
while Japanese academics and the media were debating about increased wage
inequality. In the following decomposition analysis, we attempt to oﬀer a
solution for this puzzle.
3 Estimation of a wage equation for full-time
workers
In this section, we employ the following wage equation to explore changes in
the returns to each attribute of workers’ human capital.
yit = xitβt + uit, E(u|x) = 0 (1)
The dependent variable (yit) is the logarithm of hourly wage rates in real
terms. Subscripts i and t refer to the ith individual and year t. The vec-
tor xit is a vector of the explanatory variables that are reported in Table 1;
dummies for educational attainment, squared potential years of experience,
squared years of tenure, the interaction term between potential years of ex-
perience and years of tenure, as well as the logarithm of sizes of ﬁrms and
establishments. The last term has a zero conditional expectation. We apply
the ordinary least squared (OLS) method to male and female workers sepa-
rately. All standard errors are calculated to be robust against the presence
11of heteroskedasticity.
First, all coeﬃcients on educational attainment are positive and signiﬁ-
cant for male workers (the reference variable is the dummy for junior high
school graduates). We should pay attention to the declining return to educa-
tion during 1989-2003, evidenced by the smaller coeﬃcients on the education
dummies in the later sample year. In particular, we observe a large decline
of 7 percentage points in the dummies for two-year college graduates and
university graduates between 1989 and 2003, holding the other conditions
constant.
We ﬁnd a sharp contrast for female workers. Although the dummy for
senior high school graduates (Educ=12) decreased as observed in male work-
ers, the coeﬃcient on the dummy for two-year college graduates (Educ=14)
remained unchanged and that on the university graduate dummy (Educ=16)
had a much smaller decline than that of male workers. Comparing the co-
eﬃcients between male and female workers, the eﬀect is larger for female
workers, especially for those with higher educational attainment.
Second, the coeﬃcient on potential years of experience implies a typical
concave relation between the years of experience and the log wage. The slope
decreased slightly for male workers, while that for female workers became
larger. For male workers, the wage rate peaked at 28.44 years in 1990 and
27.82 years in 2003. In contrast, the peak-out year extended substantially
for female workers: 7.13 years in 1990 and 15.82 years in 2003. Note that the
magnitude of the coeﬃcient is still larger for male workers than for female
12workers. Third, we observe smaller coeﬃcients on years of tenure for both
male and female workers.
In sum, we ﬁnd three remarkable changes in the coeﬃcients on workers’
attributes in the wage equation estimates: 1: the eﬀect of education on wages
becomes smaller for both sexes, 2: the eﬀect of potential years of experience
becomes slightly larger for female workers, and 3: the eﬀect of years of tenure
becomes smaller, especially for female workers. These ﬁndings are consistent
with what we reported in Table 1: A larger proportion of workers with higher
educational levels and longer years of tenure made the returns to education
and tenure smaller. The average years of education becomes longer partly
due to supply factors, such as an increase in parents’ income (Arai [1998])
and an increase in the number of college graduates because of the Ministry of
Education’s deregulations new college openings and expanding their capacity
(1991 revision of University Establishment Standard (Daigaku Setti Kijun)).
Workers’ job tenure has extended, partly due to the aging of the population.
The extended years of job tenure among females can be explained by the
change in the social norm that now encourages women to stay in the labor
force after marriage and child bearing (Kawaguchi and Miyazaki [2005]).
These supply shocks decreased the equilibrium return to education and job
tenure.
134 Decomposition of the variance in the wage
rates for full time workers
As we observed in Table 1, the wage rate increased in real terms until 1993
and leveled oﬀ during the remaining period, while the variance in the wage
rate declined until the mid-1990s and kept the same level after the period
with a slight increase in 2002 for both sexes. In this section, we decompose
the variance in the wage rates into that within a group and that between
groups (i.e. the composition of groups).
The variance in the logarithm of wage rates is decomposed as follows
without covariance between x and u due to the assumption E(u|x) = 0 in
(1).
V ar(yt) = β
0
tV ar(xt)βt + V ar(ut). (2)
The change in V ar(y) in period τ from the base period 1989 is decomposed
as follows.
V ar(yτ) − V ar(y89) = β
0
τV ar(xτ)βτ − β
0
89V ar(x89)β89 + V ar(uτ) − V ar(u89)
= [β
0





89V ar(xτ)β89 − β
0
89V ar(x89)β89]
+ [V ar(uτ) − V ar(u89)]. (3)
The ﬁrst term corresponds to changes in the wage structure that are captured
by the changes in the estimated coeﬃcients in the wage equation β. The
second term corresponds to the changes in the variance of workers’ attributes,
14which are captured by the change in the variance of the explanatory variables
in the wage equation V ar(xt). The last term corresponds to the changes in
the variance of the error term V ar(ut).
Figure 2 reports the results of the decomposition in the change of the
variance of log real wage rates. The temporal change of the variance is
decomposed into the following three components: 1: the change due to the
change in β, 2: the change due to the change in V ar(xt), and 3: the change
due to the change in V ar(ut). We performed the decomposition for male and
female workers separately.
First, we examine the decomposition for male workers. The actual coef-
ﬁcient of the variance in the wage rates declined, which is explained by the
smaller wage variance among groups. This is evidenced by the fact that the
graph that allows the changes in β for each year tracks the actual variance
much better than the other cases. This is caused by the smaller disparities
among workers with diﬀerent degrees of educational attainment or years of
tenure, as reported in Table 2. A larger portion of workers with higher educa-
tional levels and longer years of tenure made smaller returns to the wage rate,
which resulted in a smaller variance between groups. At the same time, we
notice that the variance in residuals, which stands for wage inequality within
a group, expanded (2), though the eﬀect of the larger residual variance is
smaller.
In sum, we ﬁnd that the components move in two opposite directions: a
smaller variance between groups and a larger variance within a group, which
15results in the smaller variance in the total wage rates. One might argue that
no expansion in wage inequality is observed by emphasizing the changes in
β, but we should notice that this is only a part of the whole picture.
Similar to male workers, the variance of the log wage declined after the
1990s for female workers, and the structural change in β is the main cause for
this change. Contrary to the male workers, the variance in residuals is on a
slightly declining trend, but the variance in x contributes to a larger variance
in the wage rates. This implies that while the disparity between groups was
smaller due to the smaller returns of workers’ attributes to wages, a larger
variance in x in education or years of tenure expanded the wage disparity for
female workers.
We further decompose the residual variance into the change in the distri-
bution of x and the change in the mapping from x to the residual variance.
To implement the decomposition, we assume the following functional form
of heteroskedasticity:
V ar(uτ|x) = exp(xγτ) (4)
Under this assumption, V ar(u) is rewritten as
V
τ = V ar(uτ) = Ex|t=τ[V ar(u|x)] = Ex|t=τ[exp(xγτ)] (5)
The expectation is taken over x and the distribution of x and its parameters
are time variant. This application of the law of iterated expectation articu-
lates that the change in the residual variance is decomposed into the change
in the distribution of x and the change in γτ, which stands for structural
16change. In other words, the residual variance can change due to a change in
the population structure, due to such factors as aging, or due to the change
in the variance within the group deﬁned by x.
Exploiting this feature, we can calculate the artiﬁcial variance that has
the variance structure of year τ, but the distribution of the attribute is that




























P(t=89) . The numerator in the ﬁrst term is the
propensity score to be in the 1989 sample, given x. For example, consider
a dummy variable for senior high school graduates as a part of x. The
propensity score for 1989 is higher than that for 2003 among high school
graduates because the share of senior high school graduates was larger in
1989 in the labor market. The proportion P(t = 89) is the share of the 1989
sample among all observations.
Using the counterfactual variance above, the change in the residual vari-















The ﬁrst term corresponds to the change in the residual variance due to the
distributional change of x, and the second term corresponds to the change in
the residual variance structure. In other words, the ﬁrst term can be inter-
preted as the between-groups residual variance change because the change
is induced by the change in x, while the second term is interpreted as the
within-group change because the change occurs within a group indexed by
x.
To implement the above decomposition of the variance of wage rate resid-
uals, we pool the observations in 1989 and year τ and apply a probit esti-
mation to regress the dummy variable that takes 1 if the observations are in
1989 sample on xi. The propensity score from this probit regression is used to
calculate the estimated value of θτi(= ˆ θτi). The residual of the wage regres-
sion ˆ ui is taken from the wage regression whose results are reported in Table
2 and discussed in the previous section. Then, the logarithm of ˆ u2
i in year
τ is regressed on xi to obtain coeﬃcients γτ. The results of this regression
are reported in Table 4. Most of the coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant.
We calculate the exponential of the estimated value, which corresponds to
exp(xiγτ) in (4) (we call this ˆ vτ
i ). Based on this predicted residual ˆ vτ
i , we
calculate ˆ V τ
89 as the weighted average of ˆ vτ
i in year τ using ˆ θ as the weight.
Figure 3 presents the results of the decomposition expressed in the equa-
18tion (7) for male and female workers, respectively. The residual variance
declined in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s for male workers, and then began to
increase after 1997. The “V-shaped” trend also is observed even after making
the distribution of xconstant at its 1989 level. This implies that the variance
in residuals expanded, even removing the eﬀect of longer years of education
and tenure. The increase in the residual variance may suggest an increase
in the return to unobserved skills after 1997, as pointed out by Juhn et al.
[1993] in the US context.
The residual variance for females also has a “V-shaped” trend, but if the
attributes distribution were that of 1989, the residual variance would have
declined monotonically. This implies that the residual variance increased
in the late 1990s mainly due to a shift in the population weight toward
groups with intrinsically larger residual variance. This is natural because
more-educated and long-experienced workers tend to have higher within-
group variance, as evidenced by Table 4. After removing the eﬀect of full-
time workers’ compositional change, we can conclude that the within-group
residual variance was stable among female workers throughout the 1990s.
Overall, our ﬁndings demonstrate that there were two opposing trends
for the log wage variance. One is declining wage inequality across groups,
mainly due to the declining returns to education and tenure. The other,
opposite trend is increased inequality within a group of workers indexed by
the workers’ attributes vector x among male and the increased heterogeneity
of labor force (increased V ar(x)) among females. The ﬁrst trend dominates
19the second trend and, as a result, the overall log wage variance declined
during the ﬁrst half of the 1990s for both sexes. Behind the declining log
wage variance, within-group variance increased for males, and this increase in
within-group variance cannot be explained by a shift in the population weight
due to such causes as aging. This phenomenon for male workers could well
explain why Japanese people have a nagging sense of increased inequality,
although we cannot conﬁrm it from the trend of the aggregate statistics.
As Clark and Oswald [1996] show, people tend to care more about their
relative wage position within a reference group rather than their position
in an aggregate distribution. As for females, behind the declining log wage
variance, the variance has increased due to the increased heterogeneity of
female workers. This can be understood as a transitional phenomenon. In
1989, females uniformly had relatively weaker attributes, but some females
started to have stronger attributes, such as more years of education or job
tenure. As a result, the female labor force became more heterogeneous in
2003.
So far, we explored the trend of the wage disparity after the 1990s by
examining the variance as a representative indicator for income inequality.
In the next section, we deal with the whole wage distribution directly.
205 Changes in the wage distribution: The Di-
Nardo, Fortin, and Lemiuex decomposition
This section examines changes in the wage distribution using a kernel density
estimation. The merit of the kernel density estimation is that we can conﬁrm
the change in the shape of the wage distribution without sacriﬁcing any
information. We further decompose the change in the distribution into the
part due to the distributional change of the attributes x and the part due to
the relation change between the attributes x and wage rates, employing the
DFL decomposition (DiNardo et al. [1996] and Lemiuex [2002]).
We implement the kernel density estimation using the Epanechnikov ker-
nel and an optimal bandwidth.5 The estimation procedure is fairly well
known, and we do not illustrate the procedure here. However, we will brieﬂy
describe the DFL procedure, using as an example a comparison between the
1989 and 2003 distributions. The wage distribution in 1989 can be under-
stood as the product of the relation between wage and attributes and the





1989(y|x)h(x|t = 1989)dx, (8)
where f1989(y|x) is the wage determination mechanism in 1989 that maps
workers’ and ﬁrms’ attributes x to the distribution of log wage, which is
denoted as y. The density h(x|t = 1989) is the p.d.f. of attributes in year
5The choice of kernel function and bandwidth does not essentially aﬀect the results
because of an extremely large sample size.





2003(y|x)h(x|t = 2003)dx. (9)
The counterfactual wage distribution that is determined by the product of
the wage determination mechanism in 2003 and the attributes distribution






2003(y|x)h(x|t = 1989)dx. (10)
The direct estimation of this counterfactual distribution is diﬃcult to deter-
mine because many explanatory variables are included in vector x, and the
integration takes place in a highly dimensional space. The DFL approach
employs a re-weighting method to overcome this diﬃculty. Assuming that
the 2003 distribution depends not on the distribution of 2003 attributes, but


















The conditional probabilities, P(t = 1989|x) and P(t = 2003|x) are propen-
sity scores for the speciﬁc observations in 1989 and 2003, respectively, con-
ditioned on x. These propensity scores are estimated by the probit model in
this analysis. The terms P(t = 1989) and P(t = 2003) are calculated based
on the proportions of the observations from 1990 and 2003 in the pooled data,
respectively. Using a calculated weight ω, the counterfactual distribution is
calculated by the kernel density estimation with analytical weights.
22We note that the gap between the counterfactual distribution and the
actual distribution in 1989 is captured by the change in the wage determina-
tion mechanism (change in β in equation (1)) and the residual distribution.
In contrast, the gap between the counterfactual distribution and the actual
distribution in 2003 is caused by the change in the distribution of workers’
attributes (the change in the distribution of x in equation (1)), holding β
and the residual distribution constant.
Figure 4 reports the actual wage distributions in 1994, 1999, and 2003,
and the counterfactual wage distributions, assuming that workers’ and ﬁrms’
attributes had remained at their 1989 level, which are calculated separately
for male and female workers. Several interesting ﬁndings emerge as follows.
First, if we examine the changes in the wage distribution between 1989
and 1994, the 1994 actual and the counterfactual distributions overlap. The
same can be said for the case between 1989 and 1999. These observation
imply that the changes in the distributions from 1989 to 1994 or 1999 are
explained by the changes in the distribution of x, rather than the changes
in the wage determination structure. This ﬁnding is common to both male
and female workers. In contrast, if we examine changes in the distribution
in 2003 compared with that in 1989, the counterfactual distributions in both
years diﬀer from the actual distributions, which implies that the distribu-
tional changes in attributes contributes to only a part of the changes in the
distributions.
Second, the deviation between the actual distribution and the counterfac-
23tual distribution is particularly large at the top half of the wage distribution.
This gap implies that the emergence of this chunk of high-wage people for
both sexes cannot be explained by the change in the relation between at-
tributes and wage. Thus the increase in high-wage people is likely to be
caused by an increase in the number of people who have attributes that pre-
dict high wage or who have high residual. In addition, the gaps between
the 1989 distribution and the counterfactual distributions in 1999 and 2003
are large for females. This is due to the increased heterogeneity of workers’
attributes among female workers, as conﬁrmed in the previous results. In
contrast to the upper-tail distribution, the counterfactual distributions over-
lap the actual distributions for lower paid workers. This observation implies
that the change in the wage rates for lower-paid workers are captured by the
change in the mapping of workers’ attributes to wage rate, or simply the shift
in the coeﬃcient for a constant in the wage equation.
Third, the degree of shift in the wage distribution to the right is larger
among females than among males during the period. The faster wage growth
of female workers than male workers is consistent with the gender wage
convergence among full-time workers during the 1990s (Kawaguchi [2005],
Kawaguchi and Naito [2006]). As the relative positions of actual wage distri-
butions and counterfactual distributions show, the gender wage convergence
occurred partly because of the convergence in attributes x and partly due to
the change in the mapping from attributes to wage or the residual distribu-
tion. We do not necessarily ﬁnd that the gender wage convergence occurred
24due to the rapid wage growth of highly paid workers; rather, the conver-
gence happened because of an arguably uniform shift of the wage distribution
among female workers.
6 The Eﬀect of Increasing Part-Time Work-
ers among Females
The decomposition analysis in the previous sections focused on only full-time
workers. But some recent arguments insist that a larger income inequality
may be due to a gap in wage rates between full time and part time workers.
Shimizutani and Yokoyama [2006] observe that one of the remarkable trends
in the recent Japanese labor market is bipolarization into full- and part-time
permanent workers. Also, the proportion of workers who are not covered by
the long-term employment system is increasing, which potentially contributes
to the inequality of the income distribution.
As a robustness check, this section performs the same decomposition
analysis by adding part-time workers, which are contained in the Basic Sur-
vey on Wage Structure, to the sample. Unfortunately, information on edu-
cational attainment is not available for those workers, and thus we assume
that all part-time workers are senior high school graduates. The shares of
part-time workers out of all the permanent workers are 1-3 percent for male
workers and 15-30 percent for female workers, depending on the year. Since
the proportion is so small for male workers that the ﬁndings are unchanged
for all analyses in the previous section, we focus on female workers.
25We rerun the wage regressions and perform the variance decomposition.
The results are mostly unchanged from those reported in Table 2 and Fig-
ures 2-3. Moreover, the regression of the residuals obtained from the wage
equation estimates are also similar to those shown in Table 4, and the de-
composition of the variance in the residuals tracks the same trend reported
in Figure 4. To save space, we do not report those results.
The only large changes in the ﬁndings from the previous section by adding
part-time workers are observed in the DFL decomposition analysis. Figure
5 reports the results. If we compare the distributions in 1989 and 1994, we
observe twin peaks: the peak for part-time workers on the left and that for
full-time workers on the right. Turning to the distributions in 1999 and 2003,
in contrast, the peak on the left gained height and that on the right lessened,
and then disappeared in 2003. This is due to an increase in the proportion of
part-time workers. The counterfactual distribution overlaps with the actual
distribution, even in 2003 at the lower tail of the distribution, which implies
that most of the change among low paid workers had occurred due to a change
in the relation between attributes and the wage rate. This could be partly
due to a steadily increasing real minimum wage during the 1990s (Kawaguchi
and Yamada [2006]). Again, it is notable that the increase in highly paid
female workers cannot be explained by the change in the relation between
attributes and wage; instead, it should be explained by the distributional
change in attributes, in particular, the increase in college-educated and long-
tenured workers. Overall, the increase in part-time workers results in more
26dispersed wage distributions among female workers. The public may well
perceive this phenomenon as evidence for expanding economic inequality.
7 Conclusion
This paper examined the change in the wage distribution among full-time
workers during the 1990s in Japan. We take advantage of a rich micro-level
data set from Basic Survey on Wage Structure (1989-2003) to perform an
in-depth analysis of the changes in the variance and distribution of the wage
rate.
Although simple aggregate statistics may give the impression that wage
inequality had not changed during the period, the decomposition analysis re-
veals that the steady trend is a product of two opposing trends: 1. declining
between-groups (deﬁned by education, experience, tenure and ﬁrm/establishment
size) wage inequality for both sexes, and 2. increased within-group inequal-
ity among male workers and increased observed heterogeneity among female
workers.
The declining between-groups wage diﬀerentials are largely due to the
decline of the return to education and job tenure because of the increase
in college-educated and long-tenured workers. The deregulation of the Min-
istry of Education and the aging of the population exogenously increased
the supply of college-educated and long-tenured workers and decreased the
equilibrium return to these traits. After removing these exogenous supply
eﬀects, as evidenced by the increase in the within-group wage variance, in-
27equality has increased from around 1997 for males. This trend is consistent
with the increased wage inequality observed in the US, the UK, and Canada.
Contrary to the main results by Ohtake [2005], as far as wage is concerned,
our results show that the aging of the population in itself cannot explain the
recent increase in wage inequality among males. As for females, the gradual
increases in college-educated and long-tenured workers make the female full-
time workers more heterogeneous. This contributes to the increase of wage
inequality among them.
The increase of within-group inequality among male workers may well
explain why the general public in Japan feels that inequality has increased
in the last 15 to 20 years, while we can hardly conﬁrm it in the aggregate
statistics. An individual presumably perceives inequality by comparing the
wage within a group to which one belongs rather than comparing his/her
wage to the total distribution. The increase in the heterogeneity of female
workers is consistent with the emergence of career-oriented women in the last
20 years, and this trend will continue mechanically as long as these career-
oriented women stay on this track.
The major purpose of this study was to describe the change in the wage
distribution between 1989 and 2003. We believe we have oﬀered the ﬁrst
comprehensive picture of the wage distribution in the second- largest econ-
omy during a time of rapid technological change and globalization. How-
ever, several research topics are left for future research. First, the reason
why within-group wage inequality has increased should be investigated, and
28the results should be reconciled with results from other developed countries.
Second, how the increased within-group inequality among males and the in-
creased heterogeneity among females translate into household-level income
inequality through marriage should be investigated. Third, if an increase in
temporal income inequality is associated with an increase in temporal income
mobility, lifetime income may not become unequal. The change in temporal
mobility should be further investigated. These additional considerations are
indispensable for designing social welfare programs because current low-wage
workers do not necessarily belong to low-income households in a dynamic
sense.
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33Table 1 Basic statistics 
Sample: Full-time workers in establishments that hire 10 or more employees (full- and part-time workers combined) or in single establishments of firms that hire 5-9 employees. 
Panel  A:  Male 
Year  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Wage  Rate  20.73 21.95 23.59    24.88 27.67 27.43 27.36 27.56   27.82  27.98  27.90  27.42  27.64  27.32   26.69  
    (14.24) (15.04)    (15.54)    (16.50) (19.94) (17.67) (18.90) (20.74)    (18.77) (19.22) (17.52) (18.16) (17.73) (18.06)    (16.09)   
Wage  Rate    23.08 23.91 24.86    25.62 28.23 27.84 27.72 27.93   27.58  27.70  27.71  27.42  27.83  27.71   27.18  
/  CPI  (15.85) (16.39)    (16.37)    (17.00) (20.34) (17.94) (19.15) (21.01)    (18.60) (19.03) (17.40) (18.16) (17.86) (18.32)    (16.39)  
Experience  21.29 21.52 21.72    21.78 20.78 20.76 20.93 21.24    21.44 21.43 21.56 21.66 21.83 21.70    21.86   
    (12.45) (12.60)    (12.78)    (12.88) (12.88) (12.81) (12.78) (12.82)    (12.82) (12.84) (12.74) (12.61) (12.51) (12.45)    (12.35)   
Tenure  12.48 12.63 12.76    12.97 12.88 13.06 13.26 13.34    13.55 13.48 13.72 13.91 14.11 13.90    14.06   
    (10.01)  (10.16)   (10.33)   (10.47)  (10.56)  (10.61)  (10.69)  (10.78)   (10.91)  (10.97)  (10.97)  (11.01)  (11.06)  (10.99)   (11.02)  
Firm  Size  1430.64 1437.37    1438.05    1488.27 1701.65 1710.73 1647.74 1463.83    1444.58 1444.14 1418.60 1430.75 1439.14 1411.77    1391.04  
    (1919.82) (1918.30)    (1918.65)    (1938.52) (1986.10) (1982.08) (1959.02) (1896.39)    (1881.05) (1876.42) (1857.81) (1865.88) (1862.54)  (1845.01)  (1835.54)  
Estab  Size 348.22 358.52 371.01    371.65 371.26 368.88 339.87 327.51    320.72 319.17 313.10 312.11 316.79 306.37    302.07   
    (1012.44)  (1031.65)  (1104.61)  (1079.16)  (1015.03)  (949.44)  (889.14) (867.06)    (863.60) (827.64) (835.69) (810.11) (833.76) (786.00)   (853.64)  
Educ≤9  0.24   0.23   0.22   0.20   0.16   0.15   0.14   0.14   0.13   0.12   0.12   0.11   0.10   0.09   0.08  
Educ=12  0.52   0.52   0.53   0.53   0.52   0.52   0.52   0.53   0.53   0.53   0.52   0.52   0.52   0.52   0.51  
Educ=14  0.04   0.04   0.04   0.05   0.05   0.06   0.06   0.06   0.07   0.07   0.07   0.08   0.08   0.09   0.09  
Educ≥16  0.20   0.21   0.21   0.22   0.27   0.28   0.28   0.27   0.27   0.28   0.29   0.29   0.30   0.31   0.31  
Observations  771824 767162    766722    768028 805650 769339 809180 823340    830670 810202 800890 764075 746800 729242    720047   
 Panel  B:  Female 
Year  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Wage  Rate  12.05    12.74 13.79    14.59 16.69 16.79 16.82 16.83    17.11 17.34 17.56 17.35 17.60 17.70    17.42   
    (12.40)    (10.34) (12.99)    (11.78) (12.97) (14.27) (10.93) (12.09)    (12.84) (16.80) (21.25) (11.80) (12.18) (15.47)    (11.45)   
Wage  Rate    13.42    13.88 14.53    15.02 17.03 17.04 17.05 17.05    16.96 17.17 17.44 17.35 17.72 17.95    17.74   
/  CPI  (13.81)   (11.27)  (13.69)   (12.13)  (13.24)  (14.48)  (11.08)  (12.25)    (12.72) (16.63) (21.10) (11.80) (12.27) (15.69)    (11.66)  
Experience  18.51    18.63 18.70    18.74 16.77 16.74 17.13 17.97    18.21 18.21 18.47 18.65 18.76 18.82    19.07   
    (14.05)    (14.17) (14.28)    (14.39) (13.99) (13.85) (13.84) (13.99)    (13.92) (13.86) (13.74) (13.64) (13.52) (13.43)    (13.35)   
Tenure  7.30   7.41   7.48   7.60   7.23   7.51   7.79   8.18   8.41   8.47   8.82   9.08   9.29   9.24   9.51  
    (7.39)    (7.52) (7.67)    (7.77) (7.68) (7.75) (7.83) (8.03)    (8.16) (8.27) (8.41) (8.51) (8.60) (8.59)    (8.71)   
Firm  Size  1104.88   1121.60  1133.79   1166.68  1602.07  1620.51  1552.72  1187.42    1192.05 1190.69 1190.44 1182.36 1173.54 1159.72    1139.79  
    (1758.39) (1768.86) (1773.59)    (1787.21) (1986.19) (1992.89) (1964.36) (1769.91)    (1767.91) (1764.05) (1757.74) (1746.48) (1733.38)  (1717.39)  (1703.57)  
Estab  Size  222.63   227.89  236.30   239.54  233.11  233.98  218.11  222.18   218.07 225.53 221.81 221.23 231.37 226.58    227.75   
    (646.93) (659.51) (694.90)    (687.12) (622.33) (601.22) (565.23) (572.68)    (566.35) (566.11) (572.86) (550.73) (620.86) (582.43)   (641.76)  
Educ≤9  0.23   0.22   0.21   0.20   0.14   0.12   0.12   0.13   0.12   0.11   0.10   0.09   0.08   0.07   0.07  
Educ=12  0.57   0.57   0.57   0.57   0.57   0.57   0.56   0.55   0.55   0.54   0.54   0.53   0.52   0.51   0.51  
Educ=14  0.15   0.16   0.17   0.18   0.22   0.23   0.24   0.23   0.24   0.26   0.26   0.27   0.28   0.28   0.28  
Educ≥16  0.04   0.04   0.05   0.05   0.07   0.07   0.07   0.08   0.09   0.10   0.10   0.11   0.12   0.13   0.14  
Observations  345645    345524 350665    349714 393848 372342 384186 349742    347652 326698 317093 295286 280402 273781    267365   
 Table 2 Estimates of a wage equation for full-time workers 
Panel A: Male   
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Educ=12  0.157 0.159 0.155 0.150 0.157 0.153 0.149 0.155 0.140 0.134 0.132 0.127 0.125 0.125 0.121 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Educ=14  0.306 0.305 0.300 0.291 0.288 0.278 0.269 0.281 0.262 0.253 0.254 0.244 0.239 0.246 0.237 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Educ≥16  0.515 0.515 0.509 0.494 0.493 0.476 0.468 0.483 0.456 0.444 0.446 0.439 0.440 0.447 0.439 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Exper  0.040 0.040 0.040 0.039 0.041 0.041 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.039 0.038 0.037 0.038 0.038 0.038 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Exper
2/100  -0.067 -0.067 -0.068 -0.067 -0.068 -0.069 -0.066 -0.065 -0.066 -0.065 -0.062 -0.062 -0.062 -0.062 -0.063
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure  0.030 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.028 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.025 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure
2/100  -0.012 -0.009 -0.007 -0.006 -0.000 0.001  0.001 -0.000 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.001
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Exper·Tenure/100  -0.013 -0.015 -0.016 -0.017 -0.021 -0.019 -0.021 -0.018 -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 -0.018 -0.019 -0.025 -0.021
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(EstabSize)  0.006 0.007 0.008 0.016 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.012 0.017 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(FirmSize)  0.068 0.066 0.062 0.058 0.063 0.062 0.062 0.065 0.060 0.060 0.061 0.063 0.065 0.068 0.065 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant  1.647 1.683 1.760 1.788 1.855 1.861 1.882 1.858 1.882 1.889 1.882 1.868 1.846 1.819 1.806 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations  771,824 767,162 766,722 768,028 805,650 769,339 809,180 823,340 830,670 810,202 800,890 764,075 746,800 729,242 720,047
R-squared  0.63 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.58 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The reference variable for educational attainment is junior high school graduates. 
 Panel B: Female 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
    1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Educ=12  0.202 0.208 0.207 0.201 0.217 0.213 0.197 0.205 0.190 0.181 0.184 0.175 0.178 0.160 0.163 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Educ=14  0.409 0.411 0.412 0.395 0.407 0.403 0.396 0.418 0.403 0.397 0.407 0.405 0.412 0.416 0.415 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Educ≥16  0.600 0.612 0.609 0.587 0.592 0.579 0.560 0.601 0.574 0.562 0.571 0.561 0.571 0.565 0.568 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Exper  0.006 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.012 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Exper
2/100  -0.005 -0.007 -0.010 -0.012 -0.018 -0.017 -0.018 -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 -0.018 -0.020 -0.022 -0.023 -0.022
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tenure  0.057 0.054 0.053 0.051 0.053 0.051 0.051 0.049 0.049 0.050 0.046 0.043 0.042 0.041 0.040 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure
2/100  -0.008 -0.001  -0.004  -0.005 -0.024 -0.019 -0.018 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.006 0.003 0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Exper·Tenure/100 -0.083 -0.081 -0.078 -0.073 -0.056 -0.056 -0.057 -0.074 -0.075 -0.077 -0.070 -0.068 -0.061 -0.057 -0.053
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln(EstabSize)  -0.015 -0.015  -0.011  -0.000 -0.003 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.011 0.016 0.018 0.023 0.025 0.031 0.034 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln(FirmSize)  0.101 0.099 0.090 0.084 0.076 0.067 0.063 0.064 0.057 0.052 0.050 0.047 0.048 0.049 0.048 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  1.452 1.495 1.572 1.605 1.679 1.702 1.741 1.736 1.751 1.764 1.766 1.760 1.740 1.721 1.707 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Observations  345,645 345,524 350,665 349,714 393,848 372,342 384,186 349,742 347,652 326,698 317,093 295,286 280,402 273,781 267,365 
R-squared  0.49 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.46 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The reference variable for educational attainment is junior high school graduates. 
 Table 4: Regression of the residuals squared in the log wage equation on explanatory variables 
Panel A: Male 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Educ=12  0.323 0.314 0.303 0.277 0.316 0.318 0.285 0.302 0.270 0.246 0.237 0.203 0.235 0.220 0.203 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Educ=14  0.404 0.402 0.386 0.345 0.366 0.382 0.339 0.345 0.363 0.300 0.305 0.285 0.338 0.326 0.309 
  (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
Educ≥16  0.732 0.721 0.728 0.667 0.684 0.711 0.681 0.690 0.658 0.601 0.620 0.581 0.604 0.638 0.610 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Exper  0.056 0.056 0.058 0.058 0.066 0.068 0.071 0.063 0.066 0.068 0.066 0.070 0.067 0.070 0.070 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Exper*Exper/100 -0.064 -0.065 -0.065 -0.065 -0.069 -0.074 -0.079 -0.063 -0.069 -0.070 -0.065 -0.070 -0.062 -0.069 -0.070 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Tenure  -0.054 -0.056 -0.057 -0.054 -0.058 -0.061 -0.062 -0.054 -0.060 -0.060 -0.054 -0.056 -0.052 -0.056 -0.053 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tenure*Tenure/100  0.037 0.040 0.060 0.044 0.060 0.046 0.047 0.049 0.045 0.052 0.041 0.037 0.033 0.030 0.023 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Exper*Tenure/100  0.090 0.091 0.075 0.078 0.067 0.088 0.086 0.065 0.081 0.070 0.064 0.068 0.058 0.071 0.073 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ln(EstabSize)  -0.080 -0.081 -0.077 -0.057 -0.062 -0.028 -0.038 -0.047 -0.040 -0.026 -0.038 -0.038 -0.031 -0.039 -0.043 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ln(FirmSize)  -0.025 -0.020 -0.030 -0.038 -0.024 -0.038 -0.035 -0.029 -0.031 -0.026 -0.013 -0.009 -0.005 -0.006 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant  -4.135 -4.138 -4.128 -4.195 -4.342 -4.465 -4.463 -4.406 -4.443 -4.525 -4.533 -4.550 -4.601 -4.535 -4.542 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
Observations  771,824 767,162 766,722 768,028 805,650 769,339 809,180 823,340 830,670 810,202 800,890 764,075 746,800 729,242 720,047 
R-squared  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The reference variable for educational attainment is junior high school graduates. 
 Panel B: Female 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
    1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Educ=12  0.464 0.466 0.408 0.385 0.341 0.334 0.311 0.360 0.302 0.308 0.311 0.338 0.352 0.305 0.304 
 (0.011) (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)  (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) 
Educ=14  0.590 0.582 0.561 0.501 0.421 0.443 0.386 0.452 0.433 0.442 0.455 0.458 0.480 0.471 0.466 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) 
Educ≥16  0.901 0.854 0.830 0.789 0.710 0.703 0.660 0.726 0.731 0.707 0.700 0.693 0.754 0.670 0.704 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) 
Exper  0.090 0.087 0.092 0.092 0.111 0.118 0.118 0.093 0.098 0.095 0.095 0.101 0.100 0.091 0.095 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Exper*Exper/100 -0.176 -0.167 -0.179 -0.178 -0.220 -0.229 -0.234 -0.182 -0.188 -0.176 -0.179 -0.191 -0.195 -0.180 -0.186 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Tenure  -0.073 -0.068 -0.071 -0.074 -0.102 -0.107 -0.108 -0.075 -0.084 -0.078 -0.072 -0.079 -0.078 -0.072 -0.073 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Tenure*Tenure/100 -0.148 -0.131  -0.111  -0.112  -0.179 -0.128 -0.129 -0.072 -0.070  -0.068 -0.062 -0.065 -0.085 -0.089 -0.085 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Exper*Tenure/100  0.373 0.344 0.340 0.344 0.466 0.441 0.449 0.323 0.339 0.313 0.300 0.316 0.331 0.320 0.318 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Ln(EstabSize)  -0.081 -0.080 -0.083 -0.083 -0.043 -0.013 -0.015 -0.012 -0.010 -0.018 -0.033 0.000  0.009  0.021  0.025 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
ln(FirmSize)  0.055 0.050 0.044 0.042 0.013 -0.006 -0.011  -0.018 -0.015  -0.002 0.012 -0.000 -0.007 -0.023 -0.030 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant  -4.653 -4.644 -4.596 -4.599 -4.601 -4.713 -4.674 -4.571 -4.635 -4.694 -4.697 -4.825 -4.794 -4.656 -4.699 
    (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) 
Observations  345,645 345,524 350,665 349,714 393,848 372,342 384,186 349,742 347,652 326,698 317,093 295,286 280,402 273,781 267,365 
R-squared  0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The reference variable for educational attainment is junior high school graduates. Figure 1: Change in the log wage inequality 
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 Figure 3 Decomposition of the residuals in the variance of the wage rate 
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 Figure 4 Real hourly wage distributions for full-time workers 
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